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WILI.S-SEQUESTRATION-AccELERATION OF LIFE INTEREST UPON R.ENUN· 
CIATION OF PRIOR INTEREST-Testator made an inter vivos agreement in 
which he promised to bequeath to his son a certain portion of his estate. 
Upon testator's failure to comply with this agreement, the bequest actually 
given, a life interest in sixty percent of the estate, was renounced by the 
son, who instead elected to receive one million dollars from the estate in 
settlement of his claim.1 The will gave a remainder interest for life to the 
son of the renouncing legatee, testator's grandson. The ultimate remain-
dermen of the corpus of this part of the estate were two hospitals. In 
regard to the remaining forty percent of the estate, 5,000 dollars of the 
net income therefrom was to be paid annually to the testator's wife, with 
the balance of the income and, upon termination of the trust, the corpus 
to be paid to the same hospitals. These remaindermen, whose interests 
were diminished through satisfaction of the son's claim, contended unsuc-
cessfully in the chancery division that the grandson's life interest in re-
mainder should not be accelerated and that the renounced interest should 
be sequestered so as to restore the lost corpus for their benefit. On appeal 
to the superior court, held, affirmed. Since there was not a substantial 
distortion among the diminished interests of the legatees, sequestration 
should not be granted. In re Nixon's Estate, 71 N.J. Super. 450, 177 A.2d 
292 (1962). 
When a life interest is renounced, the iudicially established rule provides 
that the remainder interest shall be accelerated as if the life estate had 
been terminated by the death of the life tenant.2 However, for the benefit 
of disappointed legatees and devisees, many courts have computed the 
income from the renounced interest through the application of the doc-
trine of sequestration.3 There is a sharp conflict of authority concerning 
the circumstances which render sequestration appropriate. This disparity 
is in part explained by the factual variations which arise from the terms 
of each will and partly by the characteristic lack of specificity in the general 
field of equity jurisprudence. Some courts, refusing to apply any limita-
tions to the doctrine, have unqualifiedly granted sequestration as the closest 
approximation of the testator's thwarted intent.4 Contrariwise, a few deci-
l Prior to the settlement, the estate had an estimated value of $4,000,000. Principal 
case at 455, 177 A.2d at 294. 
2 See, e.g., Union Trust Co. v. Rossi, 180 Ark. 552, 22 S.W.2d 370 (1929); Northern 
Trust Co. v. Wheaton, 249 Ill. 606, 94 N.E. 980 (1911); Trustees Church Home v. Morris, 
99 Ky. 317, 36 S.W. 2 (1896). 
3 E.g., Firth v. Denny, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 468 (1861); Sellick v. Sellick, 207 Mich. 194, 
173 N.W. 609 (1919); Trustees of Kenyon College v. Cleveland Trust Co., 130 Ohio St. 
107, 196 N.E. 784 (1935); Lonergan's Estate, 303 Pa. 142, 154 Atl. 387 (1931); Meek v. 
Trotter, 133 Tenn. 145, 180 S.W. 176 (1915); Jones v. Knappen, 63 Vt. 391, 22 Atl. 630 
(1891). See generally 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 21.43 (Casner ed. 1952); 5 PAGE, 
WILLS § 47.46 (Bowe-Parker rev. ed. 1960); 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 310 (1950); Note, 
61 HARV. L. REv. 850 (1948). 
4 See Wakefield v. Wakefield, 256 Ill. 296, 100 N.E. 275 (1912); Dowell v. Dowell, 177 
Md. 370, 9 A.2d 593 (1939); Cotton v. Fletcher, 77 N.H. 216, 90 Atl. 510 (1914); I P-H 
WILLS, TRUSTS &: EsTATES SERV, 1f 452 (1962). 
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sions have rejected the doctrine in its entirety,5 unless the testator has in-
dicated an intent that there should be no acceleration.6 One of the specific 
justifications for granting sequestration arises when the disappointed legatee 
is the special object of the testator's bounty.7 Another reason for permit-
ting sequestration occurs when the remainder is contingent and the re-
maindermen are unascertainable.8 Finally, if there is a disproportionate 
diminution among the interests of the legatees, to the extent that a sub-
stantial distortion exists, many courts and the Restatement of Property 
consider this a proper circumstance for sequestration.9 The requirement 
of substantial distortion, however, is limited by certain definitive corol-
laries. If the interests of each legatee are diminished in equal proportion, 
there is no need for sequestration.10 Secondly, if the diminished interest 
is considerably greater than the undiminished interest, the minimal dis-
tortion is not considered sufficiently substantial to warrant sequestration.11 
This was the situation presented in the principal case, in which the court, 
without discussion, treated the undiminished gift of 5,000 dollars annually 
to the widow as minimal and therefore not providing an appropriate basis 
for sequestration.12 
In ascertaining whether the distortion is a substantial one, most courts 
5 See, e.g., Equitable Trust Co. v. Proctor, 27 Del. Ch. 151, 32 A.2d 422 (Ch. 1943); 
Scotten v. Moore, 28 Del. (5 Boyce) 545, 93 Atl. 373 (1914); Hesseltine v. Partridge, 236 
Mass. 77, 127 N.E. 429 (1920). Cf. Davidson v. Miners' & Mechanics' Savings & Trust Co., 
129 Ohio St. 418, 195 N.E. 845 (1935). 
6 See St. Louis Trust Co. v. Kem, 346 Mo. 643, 142 S.W.2d 493 (1940). 
7 E.g., Trustees of Kenyon College v. Cleveland Trust Co., 130 Ohio St. 107, 196 N.E. 
784 (1935); compare Mercantile Trust Co. v. Schloss, 165 Md. 18, 166 Atl. 599 (1933); 
Schmick's Estate, 349 Pa. 65, 36 A.2d 305 (1944). These decisions refuse sequestration 
because acceleration serves to benefit the special objects of testator's bounty. 
s See, e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 380 Ill. 22, 42 N.E.2d 547 (1942). But see Scotten 
v. Moore, 28 Del. (5 Boyce) 545, 93 Atl. 373 (1914). 
9 A comprehensive statement of this theory is propounded in detail in REsTATE!IIENT, 
PROPERTY § 234 (1936). This section states in part: "When a will otherwise effectively 
creates prior and succeeding interests; and an attempted prior interest is renounced; 
and the renouncer effectively claims an intestate share; and there is no manifestation 
of a contrary intent, then (a) if the satisfaction of the derogating claim causes substan-
tial distortion among the other testamentary dispositions, so much of the renounced 
interest as does not pass as part of such intestate share is sequestered for judicial dis-
tribution among the other testamentary distributees ..•. " Before the promulgation of 
the Restatement, a similar theory was followed in a number of cases. See Sellick v. 
Sellick, 207 Mich. 194, 173 N.W. 609 (1919); Trustees of Kenyon College v. Cleveland 
Trust Co., 130 Ohio St. 107, 196 N.E. 784 (1935); Lonergan's Estate, 303 Pa. 142, 154 Atl. 
387 (1931). Since publication, the rule has been referred to infrequently. Principal case 
at 457, 177 A.2d at 297; Schmick's Estate, 349 Pa. 65, 36 A.2d 305 (1944); Will of Marshall, 
239 Wis. 162, 300 N.W. 157 (1941); Will of Muskat, 224 Wis. 245, 271 N.W. 837 (1937). 
This rule is also recognized by a number of scholars. See, e.g., ATKINSON, WILLS 126 (2d 
ed. 1937); 2 POWELL, op. cit. supra note 3, § 310; SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS 314 (1951). Sec 
generally 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 21.44 (Casner ed. 1952); Note, 61 HARV. L. REv. 
850. 
10 REsTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 234, comment i, at 990-91 (1936). Many courts are con-
fronted with this fact situation. 
11 Id. § 234, comment k, at 992-95. 
12 Principal case at 460, 177 A.2d at 296. 
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refuse to consider the increment accruing to the remainderman through 
the extension in duration of his accelerated interest. Rather, they concern 
themselves with the effect of the renunciation on the diminution of the 
remainder interests generally.13 Though there are no doubt many situa-
tions in which this corollary of the sequestration doctrine may be justified, 
the facts of the principal case present in a striking fashion, a basis for chal-
lenging it as an incontrovertible rule of thumb. It was alleged by the hos-
pitals, and not denied by the court, that to give the grandson the total 
income of the sixty percent share during the life expectancy of the re-
nouncing legatee would give him considerable gain over the amount he 
would have received had there been no renunciation.14 On the other hand, 
if sequestration were decreed, the one million dollars lost by the remain-
dermen through the renunciation would be restored to them many years 
before the death of the renouncing legatee.15 Under the result reached in 
the principal case, while the ultimate remaindermen suffer diminution of 
their interests, the grandson, by virtue of acceleration, would receive during 
the lifetime of his father an annual income which the testator did not 
intend to be his for many years. When this increment reaches the propor-
tions that appear to be present in this case, the grandson, rather than 
bearing his proportionate share of the loss of income caused by renuncia-
tion, stands to gain an amount which may well exceed that necessary to 
make him whole, leaving the ultimate remaindermen to bear the loss alone. 
In contrast, the granting of sequestration-would deny the grandson nothing 
that had been intended for him, but rather would place him, along with 
the other remaindermen, in the same position that would have existed had 
the life interest not been renounced. Moreover, this consideration reveals 
the court's misplaced reliance on the general practice of placing the wel-
fare of a family member above that of a stranger in construing the will.16 
13 REsrATEIIIENT, PROPERTY § 234 illustration to comment k, situation 1, at 993 (1936). 
In the principal case, the court stated: "There is always an advantage to the holder of an 
accelerated interest in the fact of its enjoyment earlier than would have been the case 
if he were required to await the event •.• stipulated in the will. The mere fact that 
other beneficiaries do not obtain comparable benefit has never been regarded as spelling 
out such substantial distortion . . . as should • • . warrant denial of the acceleration, 
absent a reduction of the estate of the kind here involved." Principal case at 459, 177 
A.2d at 296. But cf. Cotton v. Fletcher, 77 N.H. 216, 90 Atl. 510 (1914); Lonergan's 
Estate, 303 Pa. 142, 154 Atl. 387 (1931); Meek v. Trotter, 133 Tenn. 145, 180 S.W. 176 
(1915). In these cases, the courts felt that acceleration would be contrary to the testator's 
intent due to the additional accrual of income to the remaindermen to the renounced 
interest. 
14. The grandson will lose approximately $600,000 through the settlement of the claim 
of his father, and the acceleration of his interest would give him more than $1,800,000 
over the period of his father's expectant lifetime, the unforeseen increment thus amount-
ing to more than $1,200,000. See principal case at 455, 177 A.2d at 295. 
15 The $1,000,000 paid in settlement of the renounced life interest would be restored 
through sequestration in sixteen years. Thus, the grandson's remainder would be accel-
erated fifteen years before the father's estimated time of decease. See principal case at 
455, 177 A.2d at 295. 
16 Principal case at 462, 177 A.2d at 298. 
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The objective of a court in resolving problems created by the renunciation 
of a life interest is to fulfill the implied intention of the testator.17 In the 
principal case, sequestration of the renounced interest would have best 
effectuated this objective. 
Daniel R. Elliott, Jr. 
17 E.g., Equitable Trust Co. v. Proctor, 27 Del. Ch. 151, 32 A.2d 422 (Ch. 1943); 
Northern Trust Co. v. Wheaton, 249 Ill. 606, 94 N.E. 980 (1911); Sellick v. Sellick, 207 
Mich. 194, 173 N.W. 609 (1919); Holdren v. Holdren, 78 Ohio St. 276, 85 N.E. 537 (1908). 
